



Cyber Security Assessments

USAID-USEA Digitalization and Cyber Security Webinar Series

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About EPRI (<u>www.epri.com</u>)





- EPRI conducts research and development relating to the generation, delivery and use of electricity for the benefit of the public.
- EPRI brings together its scientists and engineers as well as experts from academia and industry to help address challenges in electricity, including reliability, efficiency, affordability, health, safety and the environment.
- EPRI members represent 90% of the electricity generated and delivered in the United States with international participation extending to nearly 40 countries.

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Cyber Security Assessments for Electric Power Utilities





Cyber Security Assessments

- Where are we now?
 - Current state assessment
- Where do we want to be?
 - > Desired future state
- How do we get there?
 - Identify required capabilities to achieve future state
 - Develop Cybersecurity Program Roadmap and implementation plans



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Elements of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)





Develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities

Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical infrastructure services

Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event

Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action regarding a detected cybersecurity event

Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

| Function | Category | | |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------|--|--|
| Identify | Asset Management | | |
| | Business Environment | | |
| | Governance | | |
| | Risk Assessment | | |
| | Risk Management Strategy | | |
| | Supply Chain Risk Management | | |
| | Identity Management and Access Control | | |
| | Awareness and Training | | |
| Protect | Data Security | | |
| Protect | Information Protection Processes & Procedures | | |
| | Maintenance | | |
| | Protective Technology | | |
| | Anomalies and Events | | |
| Detect | Security Continuous Monitoring | | |
| | Detection Processes | | |
| Respond | Response Planning | | |
| | Communications | | |
| | Analysis | | |
| | Mitigation | | |
| | Improvements | | |
| Recover | Recovery Planning | | |
| | Improvements | | |
| | Communications | | |

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| Identify | Asset Management | |
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| | Risk Assessment | |
| | Risk Management Strategy | |
| | Supply Chain Risk Management | |
| Protect | Identity Management and Access Control | |
| | Awareness and Training | |
| | Data Security | - |
| | Information Protection Processes & Procedures | - |
| | Maintenance | 100-1 |
| | Protective Technology | 1 (312) |
| | Anomalies and Events | SET |
| Detect | Security Continuous Monitoring | |
| | Detection Processes | |
| Respond | Response Planning | |
| | Communications | John Hat |
| | Analysis | |
| | Mitigation | Ne |
| | Improvements | R. The second |
| Recover | Recovery Planning | - whereas |
| | Improvements | |
| | Communications | |

How should our cyber security program be organized and assessed?

Are we accurately assessing and communicating risk?

Do we trust the equipment we are deploying?

Are we mitigating risks from third-party service providers?

How do we manage passwords and remote access to field devices?

Do we have the right architectures and technology to protect our OT systems?

Do we have visibility into our OT networks and devices?

Are our IDS tools configured and effective for OT systems?

Can our SCADA operators identify and respond to cyber attacks?

Do we have the forensics tools and capabilities to determine which devices have been compromised?

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

| Function | Category | | | |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| Identify | Asset Management | | Subcategory | Informative References |
| | Business Environment | | ID.AM-1: Physical devices and systems | CIS CSC 1 |
| | Governance | | within the organization are inventoried | COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02 |
| | Risk Assessment | | | ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 |
| | Risk Management Strategy | 3 | | ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 |
| | Supply Chain Risk Management | | | ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2 |
| Protect | Identity Management and Access Control | and the second se | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, PM-5 |
| | Awareness and Training | | ID.AM-2: Software platforms and | CIS CSC 2 |
| | Data Security | - | inventoried | COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02, BAI09.05 |
| | Information Protection Processes & Procedures | 100 | | ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7 8 |
| | Maintenance | | | ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2, A.12.5.1 |
| | Protective Technology | 1 | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, PM-5 |
| Detect | Anomalies and Events | I SEE | ID.AM-3: Organizational communication | CIS CSC 12 |
| | Security Continuous Monitoring | | and data flows are mapped | COBIT 5 DSS05.02 |
| | Detection Processes | | | ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 |
| Respond | Response Planning | | | ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2 |
| | Communications | | | NIST SP 800-55 Rev. 4 AC-4, CA-5, CA-9, PL-8 |
| | Analysis | | ID.AM-4: External information systems are catalogued | CIS CSC 12 $COBIT = APO02 02 APO10 04 DSS01 02$ |
| | Mitigation | IIIII C | | ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A 11 2 6 |
| | Improvements | المشتقات | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-20, SA-9 |
| Recover | Recovery Planning | | | |
| | Improvements | Site State | | |
| | Communications | | | |

Benefits

- Five functions easy for non-security staff and executives to understand
- Widely adopted in the industry
- Focuses on *outcomes* flexible implementation
- Industry profiles and implementation guides available
- Can be implemented with various international cyber security standards and controls catalogues

Challenges

- No generally accepted scoring mechanism
- Control set is at different levels
- Different tiers are not a formal maturity model
- Need OT cyber security expertise to correctly apply the Framework to electric power utility operations domains





NIST Cybersecurity Framework Resources

- NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) Version 1.1
- NIST TN 2051 Cybersecurity Framework Smart Grid Profile
- Maritime Bulk Liquids Transfer Cybersecurity Framework Profile

NIST IR 8183 - Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile
 NIST IR 8183A - Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile
 Low Impact Level Example Implementations Guide



EPRI Technical Assessment Methodology





Technical Assessment Methodology (TAM) Purpose



Provides an actionable, risk-informed, systems engineered based approach that guides users to:

- > Understand their systems and components,
- > Analyze the actual vulnerabilities and how the system can be attacked,
- Mitigate those vulnerabilities to an acceptable risk level,
- > By applying effective control measures.



The EPRI Technical Assessment Methodology (TAM)

- Security Risk Assessment of Systems, Sub-Systems or Components
- Scoring risks of existing control measures (effectiveness and burden)
- For Procurement <u>or</u> Installed Equipment
- Determines Mitigations & Unmitigated Vulnerabilities
- Identifies parties responsible for Mitigations







CSDS Part 1: Attack Surface Characterization

- Part 1a: Assessment Scope
- Part 1b: Target Asset Characteristics
- Part 1c: Attack Pathways
- Part 1d: Exploit Sequences

CSDS Part 2: Identify, Score, & Allocate Control Methods

- Part 2a: Security Control Method Identification and Scoring
- Part 2b: Allocation of Security Control Methods







Output of the Process



Identify attack surface

Scoring of existing control measures (effectiveness and

Unmitigated vulnerabilities

What if analysis of additional control measures

Relationships Sets

Systems and component communication Data flows Shared control measures Aids in incident response



Library of administrative and shared technical control methods



Technical Assessment Methodology Resources

- <u>Cyber Security Technical Assessment Methodology, Risk Informed</u> <u>Exploit Sequence Identification and Mitigation, Revision 1</u>
- EPRI Cyber Security Technical Assessment Methodology Video (3.43 min)
- Toward a New Risk-Informed Approach to Cyber Security
- SEL 487E Protective Relay Reference Cyber Security Data Sheet (CSDS): Cyber Security Technical Assessment Methodology Use Case Study (<u>3002017149</u>)
- Domain Controller Cyber Security Data Sheet (CSDS) Topical Guide (<u>3002015759</u>)
- Risk Informed Target Level Topical Guide (<u>3002015760</u>)
- Cyber Security Data Flow Identification and Documentation Topical Guide (<u>3002015761</u>)



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